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Anderson, W.D. (1955) ‘The importance of Damonian theory in Plato’s thought’ in Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 86: 88-102.
Anderson, W.D. (1966) Ethos and education in Greek music – The evidence of poetry and philosophy. Cambridge (Mass.).
Barker, A. (1989) Greek Musical Writings II – Harmonic and Acoustic theory. Cambridge.
Barker, A. (2005) ‘Damone e i sofisti’ in Meriani, A. (ed.), Psicomusicologia nella Grecia Antica. Napoli: 57-74.
Barker, A. (2007) The Science of Harmonics in Classical Greece. Cambridge.
Brancacci, A. (2008a) ‘I Tropoi di Damone (37 B 2 e B 10 DK)’ in Brancacci, A., Musica e Filosofia da Damone a Filodemo. Firenze: 7-19.
Brancacci, A. (2008b) ‘Protagora, Damone e la musica’ in Brancacci, A., Musica e Filosofia da Damone a Filodemo. Firenze: 21-33.
D’Angour, A. (2011) The Greeks and the New – Novelty in ancient Greek imagination and experience. Cambridge.
Deiters, H. (1870) De Aristidis Quintiliani doctrinae harmonicae fontibus. Düren.
Delattre, D. (1994) ‘Damon’ in Goulet, R. (ed.), Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, vol. 2. Paris: 600-607.
Delattre, D. (ed.) (2007) Philodème de Gadara – Sur la musique. Livre IV. Paris.
Denyer, N. (ed.) (2001) Plato – Alcibiades. Cambridge.
Hagel, S. (forthcoming) ‘Shaping characters: an ancient science of musical ethos?’ in Eichmann, R., Howell, M. & Lawson, G. (eds.), Sound, Political Space and Political Condition in the Ancient World. Berlin.
Halliwell, S. (1995) ‘Forms of Address: Socratic Vocatives in Plato’ in de Martino, F. & Sommerstein, A. (eds.), Lo spettacolo delle voci, parte seconda. Bari: 87-121.
Halliwell, S. (2002) The Aesthetics of Mimesis. Princeton.
Jirsa, J. (2009) ‘Authenticity of the Alcibiades I: some reflections’ in Listy filologicke/Folia philologica 132 (3-4): 225-244.
Joyal, M. (2000) The Platonic Theages – An Introduction, Commentary, and Critical Edition. Stuttgart.
Kerferd, G.B. (1981) The Sophistic movement. Cambridge.
Koller, H. (1954) Die Mimesis in der Antike. Bern.
Lasserre, F. (ed.) (1954) Plutarque de la musique. Olten – Lausanne.
Lord, C. (1978) ‘On Damon and Music Education’ in Hermes 106.1: 32-43.
LSJ = Liddell, H.G., Scott, R. & Jones, H.S. (eds.) (1996), A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford.
Nails, D. (2002) The People of Plato – A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics. Indianapolis.
Podlecki, A. (1998) Perikles and his circle. New York.
Powers, H.S. (ed.) (2001), The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, Vol. XVI. London.
Rhodes, P.J. (1981) A commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia. Oxford.
Ritoók, Z. (2001) ‘Damon: sein Platz in der Geschichte des ästhetischen Denkens’ in Wiener Studien 114: 59-68.
Ryffel, H. (1947) ‘Eukosmia. Ein Beitrag zur Wiederherstellung des Areopagitikos des Damon’ in Museum Helveticum 4: 23-38.
Schäfke, R. (1937) Aristides Quintilianus – Von der Musik. Berlin.
Stadter, P. (1989) A Commentary on Plutarch’s Pericles. Chapel Hill [N.C.]- London.
Tell, H. (2011) Plato’s counterfeit sophists. Washington D.C.
Wallace, R. (1991) ‘Damone di Oa ed i suoi successori’ in Wallace, R. & MacLachlan, B. (eds.), Harmonia mundi - Music and Philosophy in the Ancient World. Rome: 30-54.
Wallace, R. (1995), ‘Music theorists in fourth-century Athens’ in Gentili, B. & Perusino, F. (eds.), Mousike: Metrica, Ritmica e Musica Greca in memoria di Giovanni Comotti. Pisa –Roma: 17-39.
Wallace, R. (2004) ‘Damon of Oa: A Music Theorist Ostracized?’ in Wilson, P. & Murray, P. (eds.), Music and the Muses. Oxford: 249-267.
Wallace, R. (2005), ‘Performing Damon’s harmoníai’ in Hagel, S. & Harrauer, C. (eds.), Ancient Greek Music in Performance. Wien: 147-157.
West, M. L. (1982), Greek Metre. Oxford.
Winnington-Ingram, R.P. (1968) Mode in Ancient Greek Music. Amsterdam.
Wolfsdorf, D. (1997) ‘The Dramatic Date of Plato’s Protagoras’ in Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 140: 223-230.
Plut. Per. 4.2: ὁ δὲ Δάμων ἔοικεν ἄκρος ὢν σοφιστὴς καταδύεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὄνομα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν δεινότητα, τῷ δὲ Περικλεῖ συνῆν καθάπερ ἀθλητῇ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀλείπτης καὶ διδάσκαλος. All the English translations of Greek texts used in this study are my own. On the Plutarchan passage, see Stadter (1989), Introduction §3 and ad loc. On the term σοφιστής, cf. the illuminating analysis presented in Edmunds (2006), who demonstrates how the 5th-century uses of the term ‘show a surprisingly wide range of meanings’ (418), while it was only in the 4th century that it ‘became the standard term for the professional teachers of rhetoric and the art of speaking in fifth-century Athens’ (422). In this perspective, cf. Plato com. PCG 149, where Bacchylides is included among the sophists portrayed in his play Σοφισταί.
Plut. Per. 4.3-4: οὐ μὴν ἔλαθεν ὁ Δάμων τῇ λύρᾳ παρακαλύμματι χρώμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς μεγαλοπράγμων καὶ φιλοτύραννος ἐξωστρακίσθη καὶ παρέσχε τοῖς κωμικοῖς διατριβήν. Cf. with Plut. Arist. 1.7: καὶ Δάμων ὁ Περικλέους διδάσκαλος, ὅτι τὸ φρονεῖν ἐδόκει τις εἶναι περιττός, ἐξωστρακίσθη.
Cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.4, Plut. Per. 4, Arist. 1, Nic. 6, Liban. Socr. Apol. 1.157 with Wallace (2004), 249-267, and Wallace (1991). The literary evidence has been confirmed by ostraka from V sec. B.C. which bear the name Damon; the ostracism probably took place around 442-440 (cf. e.g Wallace 2004, 252). For different views on the date, see e.g. Rhodes (1981) on Ath. Pol. 27.4 and Nails (2002), 122.
For recent examples of this approach, cf. Delattre (2007), Delattre (1994) and Ritoók (2001), who build on positions previously presented by Ryffel (1947), Lasserre (1954) and Koller (1954); see as well Deiters (1870), 13-ff., and Schäfke (1937), 100-112. A different and more accurate perspective, though not always convincing, is outlined in Anderson (1955) and Anderson (1966), esp. 75-80. Cf. also Brancacci (2008a) and Brancacci (2008b): while these essays offer thorough and valuable examinations of the Damonian passages in Plato, their conclusions are not entirely persuasive – cf. below, footnotes 45 and 52. On the relation between Damon and the sophists and on the sophistic character of his intellectual research, cf. the illuminating analysis presented in Barker (2005). For a very productive and subtle examination of the use of Damon’s authority in Aristides Quintilianus, see Hagel (forthcoming).
Cf. the aforementioned Ritoók (2001), Ryffel (1947), Lasserre (1954) and Koller (1954). A different case is that of Lord (1978): while his overall approach to Aristides Quintilanus and Aristotle is generally productive, at page 41-42 the author argues that τὸ πρέπον is a ‘fundamental category of Damonian theory’, inadvertently taking Plato’s version as a historically reliable source.
The question of this dialogue’s authenticity has widely been discussed: cf. the recent assessments offered in Denyer (2001), 1-26, and Jirsa (2009). It is worth remembering that the authenticity of this dialogue was first questioned by Schleiermacher in 1809, but his point of view was intrinsically biased, since his underlying presupposition maintained that the Phaedrus was the first dialogue to be read in order to approach Plato’s philosophy, i.e. exactly the role that was traditionally attributed to the First Alcibiades.
Cf. Podlecki (1998), 17-34. See as well Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.4, where both the close connection between Pericles and Damon and its political implications are attested.
On the musical activities of Pythocleides, especially in relation to Damon, cf. section 4: ‘Music, Politics and Masks: Damon and his masters’.
The exact same expression (διδάσκαλος μουσικῆς) is used to describe Damon in the pseudo-Platonic Axiochus, 364a4.
Cf. Soph. 234b1, Resp. 4.426e5, Phaedr. 230b6, Prot. 309b1, Prot. 320c7. Interestingly, in Philod. De Mus. 4. col.147.39-40 Delattre, we are told that the practice of music is appropriate to τοὺς χαρίεντας and, a few lines later (which are unfortunately destroyed), Philodemus mentions Damon and his discourse to the Areopagus.
In relation to this, cf. Plato Apol. 20b4-5, the only passage of this text where Socrates uses the word σοφιστής, significantly in so far as he refers to the fact Evenos of Paros was hired as a teacher of ‘human and political excellence’. Cf. Edmunds (2006), 418.
Cf. Gorgias DK 82 B 11.1.1-3: Κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια· τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων ἀκοσμία. See as well Plato Phaedr. 277c and Menex. 239c.
See e.g. Plato Prot. 341c7-8. Cf. Kerferd (1981) chap. 7 for a very useful overview on the subject.
Cf. Crat. 391b-c and Crat. 384b. Prodicus, in particular, is associated with this theme in numerous Platonic passages: cf. Charm. 163d, Lach. 197d, Prot. 314c, 315c-316a, 317c-e, 336d-337c, 339e-342a, 347a, 357e-359a, Hipp. Maj. 282c, Meno 75e, 96d, Apol. 19e, Symp. 177b; Phaedr. 267b, Resp. 10.600c, Euthyd. 277e, 305c, Theaet. 151b, Theag. 127e8. See also [Plato] Axioch. 366c and [Plato] Eryx. 397d-e, 398b-399b.
Cf. the aforementioned Edmunds (2006), as well as the slightly different position defended by Tell (2011), 26-27.
Hipp. maj. 282c1-6 and Resp. 6.496b (Theages). On Socrates’ use of vocatives in Plato’s dialogues, cf. Halliwell (1995), esp. 94-96; with regard to the form ὦ ἑταῖρε, Halliwell concludes that ‘Socrates uses this locution not to mark a necessarily pre-existing or objective relationship between himself and another person […], but to express a willingness and desire to engage in a common pursuit of philosophical collaboration with his interlocutor’ (95-96).
Cf. Halliwell (1995), 95: ‘the force of the term hetairos on Socrates’ lips, or on those of his associates’ reflects ‘a specifically philosophical conception of companionship’. Both Plato and Aristotle employ similar expressions in relation to Socrates: cf. Plato Phaedo 118a15 (τοῦ ἑταίρου ἡμῖν) and Arist. Rhet. 1398b30-31(ὁ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν).
Personal prestige and wealth in the case of the sophists; the case of Theages is more complex: cf. Joyal (2000), 58-60 and 112-114.
Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 360-ff., where the Clouds state that, among the contemporary meteorosophistai, they listen only to Socrates and Prodicus. Interestingly, they add that the reason why they listen to Prodicus is his σοφία καὶ γνώμη, while the reason for their loyalty towards Socrates is much more prosaic, i.e. the harsh conditions he must endure for their sake.
Interestingly, in these passages Socrates undertakes a type of literary analysis of Simonides’ ode that is very similar, technically speaking, to those developed by the sophists, an affinity that is underlined by Plato a few pages later when Hippias enthusiastically approves of Socrates’ speech and actually offers to deliver one himself, significantly calling it a demonstration (Εὖ μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ᾄσματος διεληλυθέναι· ἔστιν μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω, ἂν βούλησθε, Prot. 347a-b).
Prot. 341a1: κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἤτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρα.
Prot. 341a5: ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουΐ.
Cf. Plato Charm. 163d, Meno 96d and Crat. 384b-c: here Socrates specifies that he could afford only a cheap course with him.
Prot. 341d6-9: Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι εἰ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσῃ τῷ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν. It is worth noting that the same expression (λόγῳ βοηθεῖν) denotes at Phaedr. 276c8 the incapability of written discourse to ‘defend’ its real meaning and to teach the truth: οὐκ ἄρα σπουδῇ αὐτὰ ἐν ὕδατι γράψει μέλανι σπείρων διὰ καλάμου μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὑτοῖς λόγῳ βοηθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἱκανῶς τἀληθῆ διδάξαι.
Cf. Symp. 177b4, where ὁ βέλτιστος Πρόδικος is defined as a χρηστὸς σοφιστής and his Encomium of Heracles is referred to (cf. Xen. Mem. 2.1.21-ff.); see as well Phaedr. 267b, where Socrates remembers how Prodicus laughed at the other sophists’ ability to make both long or short discourses on the same question, claiming to have been the first to discover the ‘true’ criterion of λόγων τέχνη: how to make a discourse μετρίων (267b3).
It is also worth noting that in this passage the ‘sinister’ aspect of Prodicus’ skill seems to be related to the fact that, by speaking at the council and by delivering epideictic speeches in private, he became well-known for his skills (eudokimesen) and gained significant sums of money by associating with young boys.
Ἁρμονία is a concept that we tend to link to our idea of tonality, though it would be more correct to associate it with the concept of mode. Cf. Powers (2001), s.v. Mode: ‘Mode is essentially a question of the internal relationships of notes within a scale, especially of the predominance of one of them over the others as a tonic, its predominance being established in any or all of a number of ways: e.g. frequent recurrence, its appearance in a prominent position as the first note or the last, the delaying of its expected occurrence by some kind of embellishment. […] Mode may be defined as the epitome of stylized song, of song stylized in a particular district or people or occupation; and it draws its character partly from associations contracted in its native home, reinforced perhaps by the sanctions of mythology’.
On the malleable nature of young minds, cf. Resp. 2.377a11-b5, 2.377c1-6; on the role of μίμησις in the formation of the soul, cf. Resp. 3.394e-397b, esp. 3.395c-d, with the illuminating interpretation presented in Halliwell (2002). On the pre-rational, almost instinctual appreciation that the children of kallipolis will have of the beauty of logos, acquired through a correct musical education, cf. Resp. 3.401d-402a and 4.402d. The almost magic effect of music is explicitly highlighted in the Laws (e.g. Leg. 2.659d), where is underlined also the influence that music, together with wine, exerts on older souls: it makes them softer and therefore more malleable (μαλακώτερον ἐκ σκληροτέρου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος […] καὶ οὕτως εὐπλαστότερον, Leg. 2.666b-c), as those of young people are naturally (cf. Leg. 7.789a-790e).
This kind of classification divides the fundamental rhythms on the basis of thesis-arsis pairs (feet), generating three gene, or types: the ison-type (‘equal’, as the elements of each foot stand to a relationship of 1:1 – e.g. dactyl, spondee and anapaest feet), the diplasion-type (‘double’, with a compound structure of 2:1 – e.g. iambic and trochaic feet) and the hemiolion-type (featuring a 3:2 structure, such as the paeonic feet).
3.400a7-8. Cf. also Wallace (2005), which contains many useful observations, although some of the author’s assumptions seem to me unwarranted – see e.g. 155: ‘he [scil. Damon] could not have categorised the ethos of each individual harmonia because that ethos varied from song to song’; however in itself the fact that the ethos changed in different songs does not imply that it is not possible to examine its variations and therefore, in principle, Damon could have tried to examine the different ways in which each harmonia could be used and the effects it would elicit.
Cf. Edmonds (2006), 420: ‘The sophist is the type of the expert and, in particular, someone who is good at inventing or discovering things’.
This idea certainly seems to resemble the Gorgianic theory of the effects of logoi on the soul – Cf. DK B 82 B 11.8-10: λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ· δύναται γὰρ καὶ φόβον παῦσαι καὶ λύπην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ ἔλεον ἐπαυξῆσαι. ταῦτα δὲ ὡς οὕτως ἔχει δείξω· (9) δεῖ δὲ καὶ δόξῃ δεῖξαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι· τὴν ποίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον· ἧς τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰσῆλθε καὶ φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρυς καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθής, ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίαις καὶ δυσπραγίαις ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχή. φέρε δὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου μεταστῶ λόγον. (10) αἱ γὰρ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπῳδαὶ ἐπαγωγοὶ ἡδονῆς, ἀπαγωγοὶ λύπης γίνονται· συγγινομένη γὰρ τῇ δόξῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἐπῳδῆς ἔθελξε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ μετέστησεν αὐτὴν γοητείᾳ.
The opposition between these two approaches may be signalled by the inversion of the roles attributed to the soul and to the discourse in the two passages: in the Phaedrus the operation of διακοσμεῖν regards τὸν λόγον and is undertaken in view of τῇ ψυχῇ, while in the Laches it is Nicias himself (ἑαυτόν) who is presented in a different light (κοσμεῖν) by means of the power of λόγος. I want express my gratitude to David Bouvier for this suggestion. On Nicias, Damon and the risks of excessive sharp-mindedness, cf. Plut. Nic. 6.1-2: Ὁρῶν δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ δυνατῶν ἢ τῷ φρονεῖν διαφερόντων ἀποχρώμενον εἰς ἔνια ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις τὸν δῆμον, ὑφορώμενον δ’ ἀεὶ καὶ φυλαττόμενον τὴν δεινότητα καὶ κολούοντα τὸ φρόνημα καὶ τὴν δόξαν—ὡς δῆλον ἦν τῇ Περικλέους καταδίκῃ καὶ τῷ Δάμωνος ἐξοστρακισμῷ καὶ τῇ πρὸς Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν Ῥαμνούσιον ἀπιστίᾳ τῶν πολλῶν.
Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1358b6–13: ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν. συμβουλῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπή, τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή […] δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν κατηγορία, τὸ δ᾽ ἀπολογία […] ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος, τὸ δὲ ψόγος. See as well Barker (2007), 72-74 and 47.
The terms δάκτυλος and ἐνόπλιος appear also in Aristoph. Nub. 651, once again in the mouth of Socrates, as he tries to teach Strepsiades the basic elements of a ‘good’ education (cf. Nub. 638, περὶ μέτρων ἢ ῥυθμῶν ἤ περὶ ἐπῶν), while the latter puns on the word δάκτυλος and shows his lack of interest for these refined concepts: he just wants to learn the ‘most unjust argument’ (τὸν ἀδικώτατον λόγον, Nub. 658). Given that from the extant evidence it seems that the enhoplios was a kind of dactylic movement, we cannot exclude that Aristophanes is also playing on the potential confusion that could derive from trying to distinguish between these two categories – a distinction that may have well appeared to the audience as some kind of ridiculous sophistry.
Cf. Arist. Poet. 1459b32-34, where the ἡρῳικὸν μέτρον is identified with epic dactylic hexameters.
From what we can reconstruct, all of these rhythms were somehow ‘dactylic’ in nature. Cf. West (1982), 195.
Cf. Barker (2007), 309-310.
This comedy, which apparently featured both Socrates and a chorus of phrontistai, won the second place at the City Dionysia in 423, when Aristophanes’ Clouds was placed third. On Socrates and Connus, cf. also Plato Euthyd. 272c, where Socrates states that he was ridiculed by the other boys who attended Connus’ lessons, and Plato Menex. 235e.
While the epideictic discourses of praise and blame obviously must have included some sort of evaluation, it would be naïve to assume that these proclaimed values corresponded with an actual theory maintained by the speaker: they could simply be part of a rhetorical technique, without representing a wider system of belief. For an extreme example of this dissociation, see e.g. Dissoi Logoi DK 90.
Cf. for this claim Philod. De Mus. 4 col. 148 Delattre = 4.34 Kemke.
Cf. Hom. Od. 1.346-352 (Telemachus to Penelope): μῆτερ ἐμή, τί τ᾽ ἄρα φθονέεις ἐρίηρον ἀοιδὸν / τέρπειν ὅππῃ οἱ νόος ὄρνυται; οὔ νύ τ᾿ ἀοιδοὶ / αἴτιοι, ἀλλά ποθι Ζεὺς αἴτιος, ὅς τε δίδωσιν / ἀνδράσιν ἀλφηστῇσιν ὅπως ἐθέλῃσιν ἑκάστῳ. / τούτῳ δ᾽ οὐ νέμεσις Δαναῶν κακὸν οἶτον ἀείδειν· / τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσ᾿ ἄνθρωποι, / ἥτις ἀκουόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται. On the crucial role of this Homeric passage and its manipulation on the part of Plato, cf. D’Angour (2011), 184-191.
For a very insightful examination of the musical meaning of the term τρόπος in this passage, cf. Brancacci (2008a), 13-15, who refers to an interesting occurrence of this term in a musical sense in Antisthenes (SSR V A 187 Giannantoni = Porph. Schol. ad Od.α 1). However, in this contribution the author attributes to Damon an actual ‘desire’ for these musical characteristics to be kept unaltered (cf. 16, emphasis mine: ‘Nel passo della Repubblica è ancora da rilevare l’asserzione di Damone secondo cui i τρόποι della musica non debbono essere mutati o alterati in alcun modo), a step that seems unwarranted to me, especially since this attribution is based on the presumed content of the lost Areopagiticus. So far as I can see, we can safely attribute to Damon only the statement that establishes a correlation between modifications of musical styles and changes in political laws, while there is no obvious reason to regard also the former part of the text (and especially the form εὐλαβητέον) as Damonian. This point seems to be confirmed by an observation presented again in Brancacci (2008a), 17, where the author rightly underlines that the expression πολιτικοὶ νόμοι is a hapax in the Platonic corpus and regards this as evidence that this sentence is a trustworthy quotation of Damon’s own words. Cf. also Anderson (1955), 94-96.
See e.g. DK 37 B 10, where the whole text is presented as one of Damon’s fragments.
Cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.4.3, Plut. Pericl. 9.2, Olympiod. In Pl. Alc. 1 138.4-11.
Andoc. De myst. 16.2, Isocr. Antid. 15.235, Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.4.3, [Plato] Axioc. 364a.
Cf. Isocr. Antid. 15.235, which confirms a similar intellectual scenario, and Olympiod. In Pl. Alc. 1 118c: ἐν μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίᾳ γέγονε μαθητὴς Ἀναξαγόρου, ἐν δὲ μουσικῇ Πυθοκλείδους.
Plut. Pericl. 4 = Αrist. fr. 401 Rose: <Ἀριστοτέλης> δὲ παρὰ Πυθοκλείδῃ μουσικὴν διαπονηθῆναι τὸν ἄνδρα φησίν (τὸν Περικλέα); cf. [Plut.] De musica 1136d-e.
Schol vet. On Plat. Alc. 1 118c: Πυθοκλείδης μουσικὸς ἦν, τῆς σεμνῆς μουσικῆς διδάσκαλος, καὶ Πυθαγόρειος, οὗ μαθητὴς Ἀγαθοκλῆς, οὗ Λαμπροκλῆς, οὗ Δάμων. Lamprocles, though, is never mentioned in the Platonic corpus.
Cf. Nails (2002), 309 and Wolfsdorf (1997). Brancacci (2008b), 24, agrees in detecting in this passage a rhetorical expedient by means of which Plato evokes the figure of Damon without mentioning him explicitly. However, the interpretation of the Protagoras outlined in Brancacci (2008b), esp. 26-ff., attributes directly to Damon many positive elements of a theory of education and even an actual educational project entailing the diffusion of musical education to all the citizens. In keeping with this perspective, the author interprets Protagoras’ comments on the ethical aims of citharodic education (cf. Prot. 326a-b) as revealing ‘un evidente influsso delle teorie di Damone’ (25) and as representing ‘il documento principale della ricezione sofistica delle idee damoniche’ (26). These claims are justified on the basis of a testimony reported in Athenaeus 14.628c, where οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον are said to believe that that specific songs and dances correspond to specific movements of the soul and, therefore, dances and songs proper to free men make the soul free as well, while dances and songs with the opposite qualities have the opposite effect. However, he translates the sentence οὐ κακῶς δ᾽ ἔλεγον οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον as ‘non a torto diceva Damone ateniese’ (27, emphasis mine), thus attributing this conception directly to Damon and not to his followers (perhaps following LSJ s.v. περί, where the expression οἱ περὶ τινά is recognised as a periphrasis for the person in ‘later’ Greek); but such an approach, as observed by Wallace (1991), 31, is very suspicious from a methodological point of view, especially given that the same expression οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα recurs in Arist. Quint. De Mus. 2, 80.28-29 Winnington-Ingram, a passage that refers precisely to the same theory mentioned by Athenaeus and attributes it again to the Damonians in general, not to Damon in person. On this question, cf. Wallace (1991), Wallace (1995), Barker (1989), 482 n. 143, and Barker (2005), esp. 59 and 69.
This hypothesis is also compatible with the information provided in an aforementioned passage of the First Alcibiades (118c), where Alcibiades says that Pericles ‘still’ spends time with Damon. Maybe Plato provided this detail in order to signal that, at the time of the dialogue, Damon was back to Athens, and it seems entirely possible given that the dialogue is set in 432 (cf. Nails 2002, 310-311).
Cf. Stadter (1989), 70.
Cf. Plut. Arist.1.7, Plut. Nic. 6.1-2.
For this reason, the position maintained by Lord (1978), according to whom τὸ πρέπον must be regarded as ‘a fundamental category of Damonian theory’ (42), seems to me unwarranted. Judging by the extant textual evidence, this ‘category’ is fully Platonic. Cf. also Wallace (1991), 53.
Cf. [Plut.] De musica 1136 e3-5, where Damon is presented as the person who discovered the ‘relaxed Lydian’ mode (τὴν Ἐπανειμένην Λυδιστί); independently of the historical reliability of this specific attribution, it would have been pretty difficult to attribute this kind of innovation to Damon if he was actually renowned as an opponent of musical change.Haut de page